The Gazette

Interesting Documents.

MESSAGE from the President of the United States, accompanying sundry papers relative to the affairs of the United States with the French republic—Laid before both houses of Congress on the 18th ultimo.

Gentlemen of the Senate, and Gentlemen of the House of Representatives,

THE communication relative to our affairs with France, alluded to in my address to both Houses, at the opening of the session, is contained in the facts which accompany this. A report of the Secretary of State, containing some observations on them, will be sent to Congress on Monday.

JOHN ADAMS.

United States, Jan. 18, 1799.

Letter from the Secretary of State to Mr. Gerry, dated June 25, 1798.

Department of State,

SIR.

Philadelphia, June 25, 1798.

By the instructions dated the 23d of March, which, agreeably to the President's direction, I addressed to Generals Pinckney and Marshall & yourself, and of which six sets were transmitted, one by a dispatch boat sent on purpose, and some of which duplicates must have reached you during the last month, you will have seen that it was expected that one of you would have left France long before those instructions could arrive, and which were transmitted rather from prudence than necessity, seeing no probability those expected that you would act without information. Thereupon to you and to your country irresistibly required that you should turn your backs to a government that treated both with contempt: a contempt not diminished but aggravated by the flattering but insidious distinction in your favour, in disparagement of men of so respectable talents, untainted honour and pure patriotism, as generals Pinckney and Marshall, and in whom their government and their country reposed entire confidence; and especially when the real object of that distinction was to enable the French government, trampling on the authority and dignity of our own, to designate an envoy with whom they would condescend to negotiate. It is therefore to be regretted that you did not concur with your colleagues in demanding passports to quit the territories of the French Republic, some time before they left Paris.

General Marshall has arrived and delivered to the President your letter of April 26th, with its enclosures; all which were, on the 21st inst. laid before Congress accompanied by a message in which the President declares the negotiation at an end, and that "he will never send another minister to France without a guarantee that he will be received, respected and honored, as the representative of a great, free, powerful & independent nation."

It is presumed that you will consider the instructions of the 20th March before mentioned, as an effectual recall; yet however, by any possibility, those instructions should not have reached you, and you should still be in France,

I am directed by the President to commit to you this letter, and to inform you, that you are to consider yourself as positively recalled.

I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

(Signed) TIMOTHY PICKERING.

MR. GERRY'S COMMUNICATIONS.

No. 1.

I have the honor to acquaint you that I arrived here the evening of the 16th instant, in the town of Southampton, in Great Britain: and to enclose copies of letters containing the state and result of my endeavors from the 4th of May, No. 1, and dated the correspondence between M. Talleyrand, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and myself, numbered according to their respective dates from 3 to 28 inclusive; not a letter to Mr. Duval & his answer, No. 20, and 21: of letter to Mr. King, our minister at London, and an extract to Dr. Tasse, the bearer thereof, No. 32 & 33; also the substance of a conference with the Dutch minister, a day or two before I left Paris. No. 4: and an anonymous publication, "on the President's communication" of our dispute, said to have arrived from the French office of foreign affairs, No. 35.

When I left the United States in August, 1797, the citizens in general appeared to be earnestly desirous of a reconciliation with France, on terms consistent with the honor, interest, and welfare of the two Republics: these, being free from claims and controversies in regard to territory, boundaries, and many other matters which embarrass states; and from competitions relative to their productions, manufactures and commerce, had a mutual manifest interest in the renewal of their commercial and friendly intercourse with each other. Nature seems to have entitled the United States, in their remote situation, to the peaceable pursuits of their industry, by means whereof, in its various branches, their wealth and power were rapidly increasing: and to an exemption from the conflicts of Europe; which, involving them, would check their population, drain their resources, and ensure their poverty. On a candid investigation then of the causes of the unhappy differences between the two governments, on a disposition to correct errors, to which all governments are more or less liable, and on their mutual resolution to reciprocate justice, the success of the mission was once conceived to depend; and as this temper marked the plan of pacification adopted by the government of the United States, there was a rational prospect of success.

Soon after our arrival at Paris, the scene was changed, and the hope of reconciliation being
Convinced of the necessity of harmony in the United States was proportionably increased, as the only means for preserving their welfare and independence at home, their rights and respectability abroad. In case of a war, there were every reason to believe, that they would be able to defend themselves even against any nation, or coalition that could be formed against them; whilst their citizens should consider the government, chosen by themselves, as the pole star of their salvation: should rally round its standard, when raised for their defence; should rise superior to foreign intrigues, always expert in fomenting divisions, and often aided by popular elections, legislative debates, and clashing opinions and interests; and should promote unanimity, by toleration amongst themselves. Nevertheless, the critical state of our affairs required, that France should not be furnished with pretexts for charging the American government, or its ministers, with neglect of means for obtaining a reconciliation.

When the minister of foreign affairs, in October last, was authorized by the Executive Directory, as Mr. Y. had informed the envoys, to have any communications with them, had expressed a desire to see them in their private capacities, I was opposed to a compliance, individually; not from considerations of etiquette, which had no weight in my mind, but because it would infer on me, a separate agency in matters wherein I was but jointly authorized: to prevent however the imputation of a failure of the reconciliation, then daily expected to the United States, I submitted to the measure, was unsuccessful in my attempts to make it general, and was thereby subjected to a series of embarrassments.

The particular attentions of the minister to me, lest they should be invidious, were in every instance but two, declined, and in one of these I yielded to importunity: preferences I viewed as an incivility.

The second conference which I held with the minister, being on the 18th of December, and his propositions to the envoys, were published with their dispatches. Their answer which was unanimously in the negative, was delivered by me to his secretary. Mr. Y. had expected it, and expressed a surprise that the secretary had apologized for it.

On the fourth of February, the minister by order of the Executive Directory, proposed that I should treat separately: the circumstances thereof, and of a refusal, are generally detailed in the correspondence enclosed.

The minister after war's desired me by his secretary, to communicate to the other envoys, his proposition for a loan subsequent to the war; which he soon retracting had. On this subject, our first instructions were silent: the last were explicit, and necessary to determine my judgment.

In consequence of this letter to the Envoys, of the 28 Ventose, 18th of March the Minister renewed his proposition for me to treat separate; and again received a negative answer. I wished then perhaps that I should remain last Post, until the sense of the government could be known; declaring as before, that an immediate reply were we the consequence in my determination. To act France under such circumstances was a measure which I could not justify. The power of declaring war is not entrusted with the Supreme Executive of the United States, much less with a minister: and to have thus provoked it, would in my mind have been tantamount to a declaration thereof. Indeed, to have plunged the nation into a war, said I, even if it was inevitable, appeared to me in other respects unjustifiable. Congress which alone had the right to adopt this measure, might by such a premature step, have been defeated in their previous arrangements, and subjected to other material inconveniences, and the Executive might have been disabled on grounds advantageous for forming alliances.

—Whereas mediation at Paris gained time, if this was requisite: and could not precipitate a declaration of war, if the United States were prepared for it. Other considerations had their weight. France at that time was making very formidable preparations, with a professed design to overthrow the British Government: and such were the exertions and enthusiasm of her citizens, armies, and administration as to spread a general alarm throughout Great Britain. It was evident even to common observation, that if thus France succeeded, she would acquire by the powerful navy and armies of Britain, such strength, as to be able to give law to Europe, and to regions more remote, and it was rational to suppose, that a coalition would be formed, of such European powers as were not in the interest or under the influence of France, to put an end to the war, by offering their mediation and declaring their pretension to oppose the power which should refuse it; the temporizing negotiations at Rastadt and elsewhere. Moreover, the internal affairs of France were in an agitated state, and threatened civil commotions. If then, on the one hand, a new coalition against France, a change her government, or even a successful resistance on the part of Great Britain, had happened, a favorable opportunity would have presented itself to United States, for obtaining a full and advantageous treaty; and this would have been lost, by a previous rupture in consequence of my departure. If on the other hand Great Britain had failed, the United States would have been in a much better condition at peace, than in war with the most formidable power the world had exhibited such an event, they could have but small prospects of resisting France; and it might have been deemed madness in them even to have seemed to. For these reasons, I thought it my indispensable duty to remain a short time at Paris.

The tenor of our first instructions, the last as well as the first, shows that the government did not anticipate the proposition for treating separately, & made no provisions for such an event. The French minister has uniformly insisted, that I had power to treat; because in the ultimatum he saw that the Envoys had a separate and joint authority. If the position could be established it would authorize a foreign government, at pleasure, to reduce the number of a commission consisting of two or more members, and thus to deprive the constituting government of the joint abilities of its Ministers: or absurdly to insist on a separate negotiation with each Minister, and to choose from their several treaties that which should best answer its purpose: besides, in case of the misconduct of Ministers, their government has a right to expect information thereof and an opportunity of substituting others in their stead: but I trust that the arguments stated in the correspondence enclosed, are sufficient to show, that the power to treat did not exist; or if it did, that I was justified, under existing circumstances, in refusing to exercise it.

[To be continued]