Southern Christian Advocate

CONFERENCE RIGHTS.

Our readers are informed that under the above specious caption, the abolitionists have filled many a tired column of invective, in the Northern papers, against the Bishops. Much of the dust which they have thus raised has been laid, and the truth brought into view, in the following letter of Dr. Fisk to Dr. Luckey.

To Rev. Dr. Luckey.

Dear Brother.—The question on conference rights, or more properly, the question on the relative duties of the bishops and annual conferences of the Methodist Episcopal Church, is one of great importance to the interests of the Church. Although I am decidedly of the opinion, it never ought to have been brought forward for popular discussion in any form, much less in the form of attack upon the administration of the bishops, and in popular conventions, public harangues, appeals to the democratic feelings of the people, insinuations about popery, and the like; nevertheless, since it has been brought forward in this form, it becomes the duty of the managers of our official journal to step forward in the defence of the officers and principles of the Church. In doing this, I perceive you have drawn upon you and upon the Advocate much censure and opprobrium—and Methodists are called upon to renounce and denounce their official organ, to take sides, I suppose, with those papers that are bending all their clergy against the church. You will, my dear sir, lose nothing by such attacks. The institutions and publications of the Methodist church are too dear to the great portion of her ministers and members, to be abandoned or denounced, at the signal of a few recent reformers.

It gives me pain, however, to see among those who oppose your view, the esteemed editor of the Maine Wesleyan Journal. Not that there is any thing objectionable in his manner of doing this; for, as might be expected of him, he writes on the subject like a Christian and a brother, whose object is truth. He has no party to sustain; although his espousing that side of this question will undoubtedly help to sustain a party. And already his authority is quoted by the most violent, to strengthen their cause. It is also presumed by brother Cox, and asserted confidently by others, that the bishops and the church generally will not sustain the doctrines of the Advocate. It is this that leads me to drop you a few lines at this time, assuring you, so far as my feeble suffrage can sustain you, it is at your service. I speak now of the fundamental doctrines advanced in your editorials, fairly and connectively explained. And I also highly commend the kind, Christian, and manly course with which you sustain the controversy. There can be no doubt, moreover, that the bishops will approve of the fundamental principles which you have advocated, because those are the express principles on which they have acted, in the cases of administration that have been objected to, and that have given rise to this discussion.

Where there is much said we are in danger of forgetting the precise point in question, unless we frequently recur to it. Permit me then to state what I understand the question to be; and what I understand to be your views, and the views of your opponents, in relation to it. The question then, as I understand it, is this.

Do or do not the principles and usages of the Methodist Episcopal Church require that the bishop shall present to the annual conference where he presides, for their official action, every motion regularly proposed, whatever may be his opinion of the character and tendencies of such motion.

Upon a careful examination of the subject, this appears to me to be a fair and full statement of the matter in debate. It is easy to change the question, and write and declaim about something else, as has been done, I think, by many of the writers on this subject. But this does not help the cause of truth. It only "darkens counsel, by words without knowledge."

Suffer me to allude to a few of the errors of this kind.

Some of the writers and declaimers allude to specific cases of administration at the New England and New Hampshire conferences, and after coloring and setting off these, in a strong light, they slip in their general principle, under the cover of the feeling or prejudice they may have excited, and in this way endeavor to draw the judgment to their side. This is not right. Such a course is unfriendly to truth. Every reflecting man knows that it is at any time unsafe to infer a general principle from one case—and especially so, where that case involves the feelings of partizanship or prejudice. The question is not whether the bishops did right or wrong, in a given case; but whether they assumed the right principle of action. It is one thing to act upon a right principle, but the quality of the specific act founded upon that principle is quite another thing. The bishops, at the conference mentioned, may or may not have done right, but did they act upon the right principle? They do not ask the annual conferences to judge of their acts—for these they are not responsible to them, but to the General Conference—but they claim their legal right to judge whether they ought or ought not to put certain questions; and this is the point at issue. Nay, the bishop at the New England conference refused to put a certain question because it was made a test question of the right of the conference to claim this at his hands. His decision, therefore, was to maintain a principle, and a principle of such importance, that the specific question that gave rise to the decision, was, when compared with it, as a dust of the balance.

Again, many of the writers speak of this as of a "great moral question;" and one "referred to in our Discipline;" and ask, Have not the conference a right to express their official opinion on such a question? I answer, The question is not whether the conference have a right to express their opinion on a "great moral question," and a question "referred to in our Discipline." This is ground so broad, and a proposition so loose and indefinite, that it admits of no specific and definite answer. A question may be a moral one—may be referred to in the Discipline—and yet not be the appropriate business of an annual conference under any and all circumstances. Nay, I can conceive that a question of this character may be introduced into an annual conference, under circumstances of manner, time, and place, such as would render conference action upon it not only inappropriate, but injurious, although, in most questions of this form and character, such action might be appropriate and beneficial. It is perfect sophistry therefore to put the question in this form; and seems only calculated to captivate the judgment to a vague general principle, for the purpose of subverting it to a desired decision in a specific case. This device is directly the opposite to the other. The former is an attempt to establish a general principle, under cover of a prejudice in favour of a particular cause; and the latter seeks a special verdict under cover of a vague general principle. All such reasoning is worse than vain; it confuses the mind of the unwary. We ought to bear in mind, that the decisions we come to now will have their influence, perhaps, upon the whole church, when the occasion which gave rise to them shall have been forgotten. All perverting influence, therefore should be discarded.

The question then is, not whether a conference have a right to discuss and decide upon a "great moral question," and "one referred to in the Discipline," but whether the bishop, when the question proposed is not the enjoined conference business, and when he judges the time or manner of introducing it, or the action proposed on it, renders the question not only uncalled for, but injurious, has a right to refuse to present that proposition to the conference for its official action? This, I repeat it, and this only, is the question; and all other epithets, qualifications, and statements are wrong, and prejudicial to truth.

There are others again with a similar indication of a desire to use an ad captandum form of popular appeal, who ask—if the bishop and conference differ in opinion—"Ought not the former to yield to the latter?" "Should one man set himself up in opposition to a hundred men?" This view of the subject is calculated to mislead, in several respects.

In the first place, this requiring the bishop, in his official functions, to give up his judgment to others, few or many, comes with a bad grace from abolitionists. Men who talk so much about standing alone in defence of truth and righteousness, and maintaining right in the face of the world if need be, ought to be careful how they prescribe different rules of action for others. It looks as though they desired men to yield to the popular current, when they themselves happened to be on the popular side—but not otherwise. That is, they insist upon others thinking and acting with them, whether in the majority or minority.

If the bishops find the conference opposed to them, that may be a good reason why they should pause, and review their ground, and not determine to act in opposition unless they are fully convinced that it is their duty; and when they are so convinced, I should think consistent abolitionists would be the last to say, that the one ought to yield to the hundred.

Besides, this argument goes upon the principle that the entire conference are on one side, and the bishop on the other. This would be a strong case, and would certainly be a strong reason why a bishop, in such a case, should yield his judgment to the conference, without giving up the legal right. If the conference made it a test question of the legal right, he ought not to sanction such a claim, although he might be obliged to resist the wishes of the entire body. And I would not say, that there might not be a case in which it would be the duty of the bishop to refuse to act, even when requested by the entire conference. This is a possible but not a probable case.

The cases to which this reasoning is designed to apply, however, were far different. One third, probably, or more, were with the bishop; among whom were a great portion of the oldest and most experienced ministers of the conference. This portion were not only opposed to action on the question proposed, but they claimed the protection of the bishop against being compelled to act on a question that did not belong to the regular business, and to agitate which would, in their opinion, be productive of mischief. And this, by the way, it strikes me is correct ground. What right has a majority of a conference to drag into conference matters which are not the regular business of the conference, and compel the minority, against their will, to be parties to the conference action in the case? If the conference agree to act on such question, and the bishop consents, all may be very well. But the time is come, I think, when the conferences generally will feel the importance of confining their action more strictly to their own proper business. There will, in this way, be less of collision and division than in any other.

I allude to these matters just to show how the arguments on this question has rather darkened the subject; and here I see another error in this argument about the bishop's opposing an entire conference; an error which you, sir, have exposed, and therefore I need say little on the subject here. It is this: the argument supposes that the sense of the conference has been taken, and that the bishop refuses the known will of the conference. But how can the will of the conference, as such, or a majority of them, be known before they have acted? Hence I have put the question in this form—Must the presiding bishop put every motion, "regularly proposed," that is, in the ordinary course of business, by a motion made by one member and seconded by another. The only knowledge the bishop can be supposed to have is, that the proposition is made by one and urged by another? He may not know that there is another in the conference who desires it. Much less can he know that a majority wish it. Neither can any one know this until the question is put, unless by previous caucusing and canvassing, the majority have pledged themselves before the question is discussed in conference. If Methodist preachers allow themselves to do the latter, it only shows the deplorable excesses and errors to which good men may sometimes be carried. It is setting up another tribunal than those constituted by the church, in which to mature and decide upon questions to be acted upon afterward, merely for form sake, to give them their official character. This is governing by a faction, and by extra-judicial proceedings; and shows the imperious necessity of a check power somewhere, to restrain such dangerous proceedings.

The question must be then, not whether one man shall refuse the request of one hundred, but whether the bishop shall be obliged, whatever he may think of the motion, to put to the conference every proposition made by one man and seconded by another, on the conference floor.

I will add once more, that the method of stating the question at issue, which I have presented, obviates another error, which many, who write and speak on this question, fall into. "Do or do not the principles and usages of the Methodist Episcopal Church require the bishop," &c. The question is not what this or that man may think ought to be, but what is Methodism? Now the reasoning of many is on this wise—Methodism is so and so, because it ought to be. "The bishop ought not to refuse to put the question," it is said, and we ask why? and the answer is—because he ought not! These are palpable sophisms. This ought or ought not is the matter in dispute; and we can never give the proposition in dispute as a reason for deciding for or against the proposition itself.

What is in accordance with the principles and usages of the Methodist Episcopal Church in this matter? My idea, or another man's idea of what ought to be, will not settle this question; the proofs must be drawn from those principles and usages themselves. In this respect, brother Cox has, for the most part, gone to the right source, in his reasonings upon this subject, although, as I think may be readily shown, he has been unfortunate in his interpretations and deductions. But on this point I cannot now dwell. You may, perhaps, in the course of next week hear from me again on this subject.

What I now desire is to present, if possible, free from all the false glosses that have been put upon it, the true question at issue. The real question is what we want. Declamation, sophistry, excitement, agitation, the cry of popery and all that class of modern machinery, avail nothing. First, What is the question? Second. What is the true solution of that question?

With respect to the first inquiry I end as I commenced—

Do or do not the principles and usages of the Methodist Episcopal Church require that the bishop shall present to the annual conference where he presides, for their official action, every motion regularly proposed, whatever may be his opinion of the character and tendency of such motion.

You, sir, as I understand your doctrine, take the negative of this question. In this I think you are right. The bishops take the negative, and on this they predicated their decisions in the late New England and New Hampshire conferences. Their opposers take the affirmative of this question.

Here then the issue is joined. And while you are laboring to advance the truth, you have the sympathy and countenance of many; and will, I trust, render essential service to the church.

Yours, in much esteem,

W. Fisk.

Wesleyan University, Jan. 6, 1838.