Daily National Intelligencer

EUROPE.

FROM THE ESSEX REGISTER.

The fate of Europe depends on the strength of the alliance formed in it by the combined powers. The military force this alliance actually holds, and the guards it has placed against every hope of resistance, are sufficient, while their union is maintained. Nations the most fond of liberty, because they have been for a long time in the enjoyment of it, submit to unlimited coercions, and the name of the alliance is the authority for the most rigorous measures which can be adopted. It is only when we begin to see the competitions of interests, that we may be emboldened to consider the approaching end of the present sovereignty of Europe. Every nation is overawed by its neighbors, and having its counsels abroad, has no self direction at home. The domestic affairs of nations are not then the first objects in the view of the politician, but the aids to the strength of the present alliance. We, therefore, find a deep interest in the discussion of all the measures upon which the alliance has relied for its support. The excuses or extenuations for any political want of conformity to all the forms in which this alliance has been announced, tell us much of its character and strength. Things are great as they regard the power by which the whole order of European affairs is maintained.

In Sweden we see that an indulgence to a single arrangement under the former order of things, is not admitted without all the jealousy of the ancient monarchies. No personal talents, no contributions to national prosperity, no conformity to the express will of the alliance, can give security to a crown not holden by inheritance. The military talents of the present king may give him safe possession of his throne, while he depends on his domestic strength, but a word from the alliance can annihilate his power, and how long it will be withheld is doubtful.

At the last dates, the negociations of Denmark and Sweden were more conciliating, as some propositions had been made respecting some claims of Denmark in Norway. The precise object is not so great a concern as the persuasion that these northern powers perceive their dependance, and wish to become more nearly allied by the sympathies of condition. In Sweden the state of affairs has brought a censure upon the press, by which its freedom no longer remains.

The new dominions of Russia are not so quiet as the repose of the empire might require. The Diet at Cracow has not expressed a full satisfaction in the new constitution of Poland. We might expect this, after the late partitions of that country, and from the different interests which have existed in this country. We have been often told with what reluctance Prussia renounced some of its former hopes in Poland. The more Prussia feels uncertain of the affections of Saxony, the less will Prussia acquiesce in the loss of its former possessions in this country.

But it is for another Diet, that of Germany, to compare the domestic difficulties, in order to adjust better any foreign concerns. The Prince of Hesse, emerging from the humble state into which he had been reduced, has not refused to employ the shadow of his power, as though he still existed in the full exercise of sovereignty. And his hatred to the last rulers of his country has induced him to trample on the rights of Frenchmen in his dominions. The Diet, seeing inconsistent claims every where, reformation every where needed, but not easy to accomplish, and having no comprehension of the possible success of their deliberations, rests more on the favorable events which may make the people most quiet as they are, rather than pursue what better circumstances than their own would render indispensable.

Last year at this time, the Prussians were disposed to form their monarchy upon the British constitution. The king had the affections he deserved for they who know him best speak most honorably of him. He was friendly to the liberty of the press and of religion. The courts of justice were restored, the finances had the best hopes from his favor to commerce and manufactures. Such acquisitions as Prussia had received in the west of Germany, were as little as possible disturbed in their laws. The sciences were in high favor. The first men were professors, as their names determine. The Saxons, the best people of Germany, were not dissatisfied with the person of the king, but with the loss of their own hopes as an independent kingdom.

The present state of Europe has provided to give no permanent form to any government. The Diet deliberates still. In some cases in which complaint is outrageous, the several governments are allowed to apply their own means of relief: Such has been that which has freed Antwerp from the greatest commercial oppression and from the toll of Flushing.

But the enfeebled state of Holland is not the best to contemplate the advantages of its neighbors, nor will the visits of their king supply the energies which they have been taught to derive from an active commerce, in which they were an example to the world.

In France every thing is thought favorable to the establishment of the house of Bourbon, which tends to recover the ancient condition of France. We, therefore find at the moment in which the worst state of their finances has been announced to the world, it has been thought to be good economy to make generous provision for the ancient priesthood, and six millions of francs have been named for the benefit of the clergy.

In Spain we might expect much more would be done than in France to restore the ancient government. But the propensity is to return so much faster than the state of the nation will admit, that every check throws the nation back upon its first steps, and nothing is effectually done, and not one thing is gained towards the former state more truly than at the restoration of the monarchy.

What Spain will do for its American colonies is yet uncertain, and it is too jealous of foreign nations to derive any aid, which requires any change in its former sovereignty or restrictions.

The Portuguese adopt such measures respecting strangers in their country, as might lead to every apprehension of some conspiracy. While in America they have forgotten the dangers of their home, to invade the colonies of their neighbors, giving every opportunity for Spanish retaliation. The remonstrance they have received in America must discover to them the dangerous policy they have adopted, and the rash measures it has produced. The Spaniards assure them that they had intended to send an envoy to Rio Janeiro. That the Portuguese must have been strangers to their quarrels among themselves, which had no object like that which might subject them to foreign power. That the troubles of 1812 were no invitation to conquest, and they assured Gen. Cor, if any violence should be committed, they should not withhold their vengeance. The possession which the Portuguese had of Montevideo was not happy to them. A considerable force was collecting, and every attempt to open a communication with the country was disputed by the armed inhabitants. On the other hand, the Portuguese who had revolted had kept every thing among themselves in peace, had provided to give protection to all neutral vessels which might visit their ports, and had begun to arm vessels for the safety of their commerce.