Virginia Argus

From the Public Ledger.

In going over our late London papers, we omitted the following article; no intelligence had been received to the date of our last papers to refute or confirm what is therein stated.

London, November 18.

Important Intelligence from Spain.

We have been favoured with the substance of the official reports of the late actions in Biscay, as transmitted to the Spanish government. They establish a very important fact, namely, that general Blake attacked the enemy on the 5th instant, and not on the 4th, as has been stated, and completely defeated them. The extent of his victory was not ascertained, as there are no later accounts from him than of the morning of the 6th, when he put the whole of his army in motion in pursuit of the enemy. They also dispel the regret which we felt in consequence of the rumour that 700 of the Spanish troops from the Baltic had been cut up to pieces. There was not a regiment of these engaged in the battle of the 31st. They did not join general Blake's army until after its retreat from Bilboa.

The following is the substance of the official account from which we are enabled to establish the preceding facts.

"On the 31st of October, four divisions of general Blake's army was attacked by 25,000 French. After fighting as became valiant Spaniards during the whole day, general Blake, in order to prevent being surrounded, determined to fall back and to form a junction with the divisions of the Asturians and the Marquis de la Romana. The retreat was conducted in the best order, without the loss of cannon, colours, or prisoners. They halted during the night of the 1st of November, at Bilboa. General Blake having resolved to take post at Valmaseda, the army marched on the 2d for another position, where it was joined by the Asturians, the troops of the North, and the fourth division of Galicia; a small detachment having been left at Bilboa. On the 3d, the French appeared before that city in great force, and the few troops that were there evacuated it in good order, and fell back on Valmaseda.

In the action of the 31st, all the divisions displayed the greatest gallantry, in maintaining their position against a very superior force during the whole day, with unexampled energy, and left the field of battle with reluctance; the enemy, notwithstanding his superiority, was unable to gain a foot of ground. The loss of the Spaniards was considerable, but that of the French much greater; so that they were incapable of molesting the Spaniards in their retreat, which was effected in the most orderly manner, without the loss of a single knapsack.

The army being concentrated at Valmaseda, general Blake received information, on the 4th, that a division of the enemy, consisting of 10,000 men, was marching on the heights of Ontario, with a view of cutting off a division of his army posted in that place. He therefore put his troops in motion at day break of the 5th, and at one o'clock attacked the enemy. After obstinate battle, which lasted till dark he completely put them to the rout, with great slaughter, and the loss of many prisoners, one howitzer, two ammunition waggons, and a considerable quantity of provisions. Till eleven o'clock of the night of the 5th, when the dispatch was sent on, prisoners and baggage continued to be brought in. The number and rank of the prisoners cannot be exactly stated, as our troops continued the pursuit, and there were the best founded hopes they would be able to capture a great part of the French division, who finding their retreat by the high road cut off, defiled by the edge of the mountains, skirting the valleys, in which direction they were closely pursued. On the morning of the 6th, all the army marched forward, and earnestly solicited permission to enter Bilboa at the point of the bayonet. We anxiously await the result of this enterprize, which, there is every reason to hope, will prove successful."

The army under general Blake was inferior to that of the French, but displayed a degree of steadiness, resolution, and valour, which afford the most flattering prospect; and those who are incredulous with respect to the comparative numbers, may have their doubts cleared by a reference to the return of this army, published in the supplement to the Madrid Gazette of the 21st of October, as transmitted by general Blake himself; from which it appears, that the number of effective men on the 9th of October was short of 23,000: the sick, absent, servants, the artillery of reserve (a marine battalion), and those appointed to train the recruits, amounting to more than 3000 men, which joined to the above number, constitutes the whole of the strength generally assigned. In this are not included the division of the Asturias, amounting to 8000 men, and the troops from the North that have since joined. It is therefore obvious, that in the action of the 31st general Blake had only 17,000; for deducting from the 23000 the 4000 of the 4th division who were not in the action, those who garrisoned Bilboa and the out posts in the rear and on the flanks, there remain only 17,000; and these were destitute both of cavalry and artillery, the nature of the country not allowing that description of force to act.

The above is an authentic account of the occurrences from the 31st October to the 6th instant. We shall only add, that major Cariol, in his dispatches to government, affirms, that no troops ever conducted themselves with greater valour and intrepidity than the Spanish soldiers; and as a proof of the patience with which they endured privation and fatigue, he states, that during the above time the Spanish army had no other supply of provisions than a scanty ration of bread, furnished them at Bilboa on the night of the 1st, and, some articles of provisions which they collected in the neighboring mountains; notwithstanding which, the greatest regularity and cheerfulness prevailed: their minds being wholly intent on attacking the enemy, and calling on the general to lead them to Bilboa, to carry it at the point of the bayonet.

The illustrious Blake, who has acquired so much glory since the commencement of his operations, was present in the hottest parts of the battle, exposing his person like a private soldier, wherever necessity required, and cheering and animating the troops. He would not entrust to any one else the command of the division which covered the retreat, but conducted it in person. In the same manner he superintended on their arrival at Bilboa, the distribution of the scanty ration furnished to the troops; his own food consisting only of the common rations; and this rule he observed so strictly, that from the 1st to the 3d, during the temporary scarcity, he was the last to receive his allowance, and his only sustenance was a piece of ammunition bread given to him by his servant.

Major Carrol states, that the retrograde movement on the 1st, besides the object of forming a junction with the divisions in the rear, was also adopted with a view to the concerted operations of the armies of the centre and the right, and that the Gallicians expected to return in a few days to recover the ground they had lost, which expectation was fulfilled by their march forward on the following days.