The Saint Paul Globe

CAMPAIGN IS NOW ON Continued From First Page.

that history, but an outline of the most important and determining circumstances. Fortunately, it is possible to disentangle the prominent features from less important and merely incidental occurrences. It is indeed remarkable to what an extent jugglery of words is made to do substantial service in the present Republican programme. For example, in December, 1897, the president, referring to the suggestion of a possible seizure of Cuba, characterized such an act as criminal aggression; but when he came afterwards to the execution of precisely such a policy against the Philippine islands he declared it in his proclamation to be benevolent assimilation. Again, the Constitution of the United States FORBIDS SLAVERY UNDER OUR FLAG, but President Schurman, of the Philippine commission, when called upon to defend the act of the president in negotiating a treaty with the sultan of Sulu, whereby slavery is recognized and protected, thought he avoided the difficulty presented by the apparent conflict between the president's treaty and the Constitution of the United States by saying that the slavery complained of in the Sulu islands was really not slavery at all, but only "a mild form of domestic bondage."

No; the Filipinos were our allies. Not only do the facts prove this, but we are not entirely without official recognition of the relation. Among the experts that gave testimony before our peace commission at Paris, pending the negotiation of the treaty which closed the war with Spain, was Commander R. B. Bradford, who has been in the naval service of the United States for nearly forty years. Senator Frye, a member of the commission asked the witness the following question: "Suppose the United States, in the progress of the war, found the leader of the present Philippine rebellion an exile from his country in Hong Kong and sent for him and brought him to the islands in an American ship, and then furnished 4,000 or 5,000 stands of arms and allowed him to purchase as many more stands of arms in Hong Kong, and accepted his aid in conquering Luzon, what kind of a nation, in the eyes of the world, would we appear to be to surrender Aguinaldo and his insurgents to Spain to be dealt with as they pleased?"

Commander Bradford answered: "We become responsible for everything he has done. He is our ally, and we are bound to protect him." It will be the judgment of history, and it ought to be the judgment of every patriotic, thoughtful American citizen, that if the Filipinos were so much our allies that we could not in honor turn them over again to the despotism of Spain, they were also our allies sufficiently to be protected against the assertion upon our part of the very claim to govern them against their will and without their consent, which was asserted by Spain, and which we assisted them to resist.

Gen. Charles A. King, of Milwaukee shortly after his return home from the Philippines, made the following statement: "The Americans here do not realize the truth that nine-tenths of the people in the Philippines can read and write. You see the people are all Catholics, and their children are educated in the parochial schools. They have a good common school education. There is no culture excepting among the higher classes, of course, but there is fair education everywhere, and many people have ability. The men in power whom I have met are gentlemen, many of them scholars, educated abroad, accomplished in manners, perfect in courtesy, broad-minded and ripe in judgment. There is no reason in the world why the people should not have the self-government which they so passionately desire, so far as their individual ability to carry it on goes."

Admiral Dewey himself, in a letter dated Aug. 29, 1899, to the peace commissioners in Paris, said: "In a telegram sent to the department on June 23, I expressed the opinion that these people are far superior in their intelligence and more CAPABLE OF SELF GOVERNMENT than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races. Further intercourse with them has confirmed me in this opinion."

It is impossible to determine the exact time at which the authorities at Washington decided to take forcible possession of the Philippine islands. It is clear that Admiral Dewey for a considerable period after the battle of Manila bay had no knowledge of such an intention. Gen. Anderson, who took command of our land forces in the islands about the first of July, 1898, says in an article in the North American Review for February, 1900: "I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines if they were captured." There will be but little dissent from the proposition that if he came to Manila with such knowledge the most obvious considerations of justice and fairness required that the Filipinos be speedily acquainted with it. Yet they were permitted to indulge all the illusion of hope from our supposed friendliness to their plans of independence with which their proclamations had made us familiar. Concealing in his mind the design of his government to seize the islands and subjugate their people when the convenient opportunity should arrive, Gen. Anderson could thus address Aguinaldo in his letter of July 4, 1898: "General: I have the honor to inform you that the United States of America, whose land forces I have the honor to command in this vicinity, being at war with the kingdom of Spain, has entire sympathy and most friendly sentiments for the native people of the Philippine islands. For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your people co-operate with us in the military operations against the Spanish forces."

Under the circumstances what possible meaning could this language from our commanding general have, except that which the confiding and grateful Filipinos at once put upon it? They were fighting for independence. They had proclaimed their object to the ears of the world. We knew it. They knew that we knew it.

It was not long before a feeling of restraint grew up between the American and Filipino commanders. Gradually their communications became less frequent, more formal and not so cordial as at first. It would appear as if preparations were making for the break which our designs must sooner or later produce. Upon the arrival of Gen. Merritt, who succeeded Gen. Anderson as commanding officer, the Filipinos were made to feel a distinct change in their status. Familiar intercourse was discouraged. Requests became more like commands. Reinforcements continued to be landed in places suitable to our convenience without paying much respect to the remonstrances of the insurgent government. As the time approached for the simulated attack on the city of Manila, the Filipinos were maneuvered out of the trenches they had held so long and their places were taken by American soldiers.

When the city capitulated it was the intention to deprive not only Aguinaldo, but his troops, of all participation in the glory in entering the city and in the honor of occupying it. Yet at the loss of many lives the Filipinos took several of the suburbs, and, despite our arrangements to the contrary, a considerable number entered the city proper.

After the fall of Manila the Filipinos were compelled to retire from the city and to occupy lines constantly more and more remote. The plan to possess the whole Philippine archipelago, and to subdue it if necessary by force of arms, was bluntly set forth by the president in his instructions to Gen. Otis under date of Dec. 21, 1898, which were embodied by the latter in the famous proclamation of Jan. 3, 1899. It is important to bear in mind the time when this proclamation was made as touching the question of the president's right to issue it, its responsibility for the warfare that followed, and its relation to the general subject of arbitrary power whose increasingly easy assumption and exercise are the invariable accompaniments of imperialism.

On the 12th of August, 1898, the protocol, or preliminary peace agreement between Spain and the United States, was signed at Washington. Its third article was as follows: The United States will hold and occupy the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines. Nothing could be more definite than this. Until the formal treaty of peace should be concluded this government had no atom of authority in the Philippines beyond the "city, bay and harbor of Manila." The capitulation of the city on the day following the execution of the protocol, but before the latter fact was known, gave us nothing that was not already ours under the agreement; and even if this had not been so the protocol would in international law have controlled.

Now, observe a few things with respect to this third article of the protocol and its consequences:

First, our rights do not extend beyond Manila until "the conclusion" of the treaty of peace;

Second, it is the treaty of peace when "concluded," and not the caprice or presumption of a president or any other officer, which is to dispose of the Philippines as a whole;

Third, the constitution of the United States makes the senate a co-ordinate part of the treaty-making power;

Fourth, the treaty was approved by the United States senate Feb. 6, 1899;

Fifth, while technically a treaty is not "concluded" until it is formally ratified, and this treaty of Paris was not ratified until March, 1899, still, in order to make every possible concession, I will suppose that public sentiment and constitutional law might have been satisfied properly if the president had undertaken to act under the treaty immediately after its approval by the senate, and when, consequently, he was assured that so far as this government was concerned, the treaty was authorized.

But the proclamation referred to was made public in Manila on the 3d day of January, 1899, more than thirty days before either the president or the United States government had one single particle of rightful power outside of Manila city, bay and harbor. In a speech at Pittsburg a year ago tomorrow President McKinley himself said: "Until the treaty was ratified we had no authority beyond Manila city, bay and harbor. We then had no other title to defend, no authority beyond that to maintain." But surely if we had no title outside of Manila to "defend" we could not obtain such a title by a mere assertion of it; and if we had no other authority to "maintain" how could we get it by mere assumption?

Yet the president's proclamation begins as follows: The destruction of the Spanish fleet in the harbor of Manila by the United States naval squadron by Rear Admiral Dewey, followed by the reduction of the city and the surrender of the Spanish forces practically effected the conquest of the Philippine islands and the suspension of Spanish sovereignty therein. With the signature of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain and as the result of the victories of American arms, the future control, disposition and government of the Philippine islands are ceded to the United States.

ESSENCE OF IMPERIALISM.

Divested of its cant, and made over into plain language, the proclamation tells the Filipinos that we have seized their country by brute force and propose to hold it; and that they must submit to our pretensions, yield to our "assumed" authority, or be shot to death. It baldly proclaims the right of conquest, the highway robbery of nations. For the first time in American history it is asserted by the responsible leader of a great party and a president of the republic, that we may rightfully wage war for purposes of dominion and acquire property in the land of other nations and jurisdiction over their liberties and persons by the mere test of superior strength. It violates the most sacred traditions of our history. Thomas Jefferson declared: If there be one principle more deeply rooted than any other in the mind of every American, it is that we should have nothing to do with conquest. And again: "Conquest is not in our principles. It is inconsistent with our government."

Despite the lack of system involved in the plan, I shall now take up the speech of Mr. Roosevelt and comment upon its principal points, finding therein sufficient text for such further discussion on the question of imperialism as the limits of our time this evening will permit.

As the deliberate contribution of a candidate for the great office of vice president, and of a possible president, to the discussion of one of the most momentous campaigns in our history, it must be confessed that this St. Paul speech by Theodore Roosevelt is enormously disappointing. Neither in matter or in manner is it worthy of its occasion. In respect of argument, the speech is, with rare exceptions, an alternation of evasion and assertion. In spirit it is a compound of scold and scullion. As to its facts it abounds in inaccuracies which, if accidental, are inexplicable as coming from a man who has performed creditably in history and biography. But the world is accustomed to inconsistencies from Mr. Roosevelt. It has long looked upon him as a predestinated and incorrigible eccentric. It has given up attempting to explain him or to reconcile him with himself. It is quite impossible, whether it would be worth while otherwise or not, to make an entirely satisfactory diagnosis of a civil service reformer in partnership with Thomas C. Platt; a citizen soldier who ridicules the volunteer; a leader in battle who finds glory in being rescued from an ambush; a hero who boasts of shooting a fleeing foe in the back; a candidate who plays and poses to delegates and galleries to obtain a nomination that he does not want; a gentleman who charges six and one-half millions of his fellow countrymen with lawlessness, dishonesty and cowardice; a statesman who, mounted on a hobby, rides roughly at grave questions in economics and politics swinging his partisan lariat and yelling like an intellectual Comanche.

As examples of the evasive style, which conveniently, like Mr. Podsnap, sweeps away arguments too hard to answer, I quote a few expressions from Mr. Roosevelt's speech:

"There is little need to argue against free silver now."

"It hardly seems worth while to waste any time upon what the Kansas City people call imperialism and militarism."

"What they say about Cuba and Porto Rico need not detain us for a moment."

It is hardly necessary to discuss what they say about 'the constitution following the flag.'

We cannot argue with them on this proposition (i. e., the danger of militarism), because no serious man believes for one moment that they believe what they assert."

In illustration of the assertive method as a substitute for argument, I shall quote only a very few choice and characteristic specimens among a legion. He declares that the success of the opposition in 1896 would have produced 'fearful misery, fearful disaster at home; it would have meant the shame that is worse than misery and disaster.' But he does not condescend to explain how and why these dire results would have happened.

In a similar spirit of doleful prophecy he now exclaims that the election of Mr. Bryan "would cause economic and financial chaos," without specifying the manner and reason of it. He asserts the lack of sufficient material among the Democracy and its allies to furnish cabinet ministers competent to their duties; which reminds me that Rufus Choate and many other good men entertained similar doubts respecting Mr. Lincoln and his associates forty years ago. The smug assurances of some of the Republican leaders that they possess all the brains in the United States is probably the most gigantic exhibition of conceit in history. That they can impose their own estimate of themselves on a public that has seen them skulk and run to avoid nearly every attempt of ours at debate and discussion with them for the past four years, is not to be believed. Nor, in my opinion, will they succeed in scaring the voters of America, like children in a nursery, with the conjured bogie man whom they regularly bring upon the stage, in the dim half-light of their campaign tragedy, to represent the alleged brutish incapacity and devilish malignity of the Democratic party and its friends. When any body of men come to regard themselves as the center and pivot of the universe, it is no wonder they assume to own and manage it. It is then time to dispense with them. The patience of the common-sense people of this country will not indefinitely endure the ineffable presumption of the self-vaunted guardians of the country. A demagogue can successfully play the demi-god to nobody but himself.

The only contribution the governor makes to the discussion of the money question is a fling at the impossible "48-cent dollar," and the threadbare charge of repudiation against all men who believe in the free coinage of silver as well as of gold. Mr. Roosevelt NEVER SAW A 48-CENT DOLLAR, and thus far nobody in the United States has proposed to make one. The insult of imputing to us a design to repudiate debts, when the claim of bimetallists is only that a dollar should be kept as nearly as possible at a stable value, as indicated by relative constancy in general purchasing power, would appear to be founded in entire ignorance of the fact that bimetallism has a recognized standing in economic philosophy, and is today advocated by a majority of the thinkers of the world.

Consistently enough, Mr. Roosevelt has not a word to say in affirmative support of the present financial programme of his party, which aims at the complete destruction of the greenback, once the cherished child of Republican statesmanship, and the enthronement of a great banking oligarchy, in the place of the people's government, to control the money system of the country from the standpoint of private interest rather than from that of public welfare.

Similarly he denounces as insincere and impracticable the opposition of the Democratic party to the trusts but prudently forbears to indicate his own position on that great question, or to show to the voters of the country how the Republican party, dominated by trust magnates and financed by trust contributions, can be relied on to afford them any relief from the growing burdens of monopoly.

But it is on the subject of militarism and imperialism that the governor is in his element. His strenuous soul finds congenial employment in contemplation of broil and battle. His impetuous and masterful temperament delights in the methods of military government. He is hampered by discussion. He prefers the free action of an autocratic will to the slower processes of authority regulated by law and constitutional restraints and responsible to a meddling and hesitating public sentiment.

To those persons who are inclined to doubt whether, after all, there is any real danger of a drift to actual imperial methods in our government, I commend a careful reading of Gov. Roosevelt's speech. He would become, in event of the election of the Republican ticket, a great power in the administration. In a contingency that, unfortunately, has many precedents in our history, he would occupy the presidential office. No one, it seems to me, can look upon his intimate association with the policy of the government without the gravest apprehensions. His natural tendencies are imperialistic. He is a sort of political Rudyard Kipling. He is the German emperor misplaced in a republic. At or near the head of our affairs he would constantly wear an international chip upon his official shoulder, which, if necessary in order to start a row, he would be ready to brush off with his own hand.

Can anybody doubt, having in view the utterances of Mr. Roosevelt and his well known personal attributes, that if his voice should become potent in the government we should be speedily concerned, if not actually leading, in the partition of China? Where else in the world do present events portend so pressing and immediate an opportunity to carry on the "world's work?"

I warn the people of America not to be deceived by the elaborate disclaimers of the administration at this time respecting imperial designs in China. The election is too near at hand to be lost sight of in reckoning the factors now influencing action, and especially profession, at Washington.

Fellow citizens, this new policy of colonialism cannot be carried on without a radical change in the character of our institutions. A republic is not suited to imperial methods. Its procedure is too slow, too public and too cumbersome. Something of the military system must be introduced into administration, and this, of course, implies ultimately a fundamental alteration in the very structure, an absolute reaction, in even our domestic government.

Gov. Roosevelt demands to know of what avail are our "trivial criticisms" of the administration as against the "substantial gain for American honor and interests."

IS IT A "TRIVIAL CRITICISM"

to complain of the open violation of the constitution by the president in practically declaring war against the Filipinos and in waging it against them for the possession of their country before he had the slightest authority beyond the city, bay and harbor of Manila; and by the negotiation of an agreement with the sultan of Sulu whereby the flag of the republic is solemnly covenanted to float over the harem and the auction block among a race of pirates and man-hunters? Is it a "trivial criticism" to point out that the policy of the administration involves the repudiation of the Declaration of Independence and a fundamental revolution in the government? If so, then may heaven preserve us from soon encountering any really serious problems in our politics.

How has our breach of faith toward our allies redounded to our "honor?" In what way shall we add to our "interests" by killing off the best of our prospective customers and earning the distrust and hatred of the survivors? How will our general prosperity be enhanced by spending hundreds of millions of dollars on armaments and soldiers, raised by heavy taxation on the masses of our people, in order to see a return in thousands to the few who will export to meet the demands of a trade of comparatively insignificant magnitude? Will labor profit from the inflow of goods manufactured by American factories in the Philippines or in China with Malay or Mongolian labor on wages of $3 a month? Will the workingman rejoice in the increasing competition for employment to see hordes of new brown or yellow citizens hastening to our shores for work to do?

Mr. Roosevelt, although he professes much solicitude for the flag, and deprecates Democratic success, because in that event it would be "trailed in the dust," nevertheless sees no connection between it and the constitution. But, my friends, the flag of the government of the United States is the symbol of its power. The constitution is the source of that power. Detach the symbol from the substance and what remains? Nothing but a piece of colored bunting, beautiful to the eye, no doubt, but stripped of that glorious heraldry in which its claim to the love and veneration of men has always resided, the invisible blazonry of the principles of the Declaration of Independence and the guaranties of the constitution.

The constitution created a government of delegated and limited powers. Ultimate sovereignty, that final, absolute and unconditional political authority of a nation, the people of the United States did not choose to part with. The tenth amendment, part of which is known as the Bill of Rights of the constitution expressly declares that the powers not granted "to the United States are reserved to the people."

And yet distinguished defenders of the present policy in public life, as well as hundreds of the great journals of the country, are proclaiming the novel, monstrous, tyrannical and dangerous doctrine that the United States has all the powers in respect to the newly ceded islands that "any nation in this world has," simply because it is a nation. The claim is boldly made for the possession of certain authority of the most sovereign description, where there is admittedly no grant of it in the constitution on the ground of sundry vague "inherent powers of nationality." There are indeed these powers of nationality, but they are "inherent," not in the constitution wherein the people have made a president, a congress, and a supreme court, and carefully defined what these creatures may do, but IN THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES ALONE.

Whenever they shall choose to exercise these powers they will amend the constitution and bestow the execution of them on some branch or officers of the government. Until then these vast capacities do not, practically speaking, exist. The constitution our fathers framed is responsive to all the requirements of liberty, but it must be amended before any warrant can be found in it for the erection of arbitrary power anywhere by the government of the United States.

But I must close. In doing so let me also claim the merit claimed by Mr. Roosevelt at St. Paul, of meaning to speak to you rather as a citizen and patriot than as a partisan. All of us desire the true glory of our country. Not all of us agree what that glory consists in. Let us earnestly and solemnly inquire, and, as our honest judgment is, so let us have the courage to follow it. For myself I confess that the past glory of my country seems founded on the greatest and truest principles, and I should infinitely prefer that her future should still more nobly emphasize and illustrate them than witness their abandonment. I dread to see a future dedicated to power succeed to a past that has been consecrated to liberty. God grant this transformation may not come! God grant that the sacred mission of the great republic among the nations of the earth may still be safe in the keeping of men and women that revere the memory of the fathers and recall and obey their precepts. This consummation cannot lessen the material advancement of the country, while it will vastly enhance the happiness of the human race.

The speech, which will be used as a campaign document, is considered as Mr. Towne's greatest political effort. At its conclusion he was tendered an ovation by the multitude present.

Mr. Towne will leave Tuesday or Wednesday for Idaho and other Western points to enter actively into the work of the campaign.