The Seattle Post Intelligencer

WOODLAND PARK BOUGHT

Contract of Purchase Executed by Board of Public Works.

OPPOSED BY MR. THOMSON.

President of the Board Inclined to Find Technical Objections to the Sale—Corporation Counsel Humphrey Says the Deal Is Legal—According to Contract, the City Incurs No General Liability.

President Thomson, of the board of public works, signed the contract of purchase of Woodland park late yesterday afternoon, after a rather interesting session of the board, and after Gen. Carr had made a strong protest against the execution of the contract. The terms of the sale of the park, as found in the instruments executed by Mr. Thomson, by direction of the board of public works, provide that the city shall, on acceptance of the deed to the park, pay $5,000, that on January 1, 1901, the city shall pay $5,000 more, and that on the first of every January thereafter, until the remainder shall have been paid, the city shall pay $10,000, with interest on the deferred payments at the rate of 4 per cent. per annum, the purchase price being $100,000.

The contract of purchase, together with a resolution setting forth the fact that the council had by ordinance purchased the park and had directed the board of public works to execute the contract of purchase, was presented to the board by Corporation Counsel Humphrey. Mr. Howe, representing Mrs. Phinney; Gen. Carr, representing Robert Abrams, who attempted in the superior court to prevent the purchase, and Daniel Jones, Mrs. Phinney's agent, were present at the meeting of the board.

Mr. Thomson asked the corporation counsel whether the board was justified under the law in executing the contract of purchase. "Suppose it is held by the courts," Mr. Thomson said, "that the ordinance is illegal? Have we any recourse for the $5,000 to be paid Mrs. Phinney on acceptance of the deed?"

Mr. Humphrey, replying, stated that the council had directed the purchase of the park by ordinance, and that the board was simply performing a ministerial act in following the terms of the ordinance, which Judge Moore had held to be legal and valid.

An Emphatic Protest.

Gen. Carr made a verbal but none the less emphatic protest against the execution of the contract. He appeared to inform the board, he said, that a suit was pending in the courts, prosecuted in good faith, to prevent the fulfillment of the contract of purchase, and that although the superior court had decided against the plaintiff, his client, an appeal would be taken to the supreme court. He claimed that in view of the circumstances the board should not execute the contract until a final adjudication of the question raised before Judge Moore had been had.

Mr. Howe replied to Gen. Carr, saying: "The only question involved in this matter is whether the ordinance and purchase create a general liability on the part of the city. Judge Moore held that this was not the case. This is the end of the matter. The board can now with perfect safety enter into this contract, and I hope it will do so and end the matter."

Mr. Howe read from the contract to show that the vendor, Mrs. Phinney, agreed to accept only the mortgage on the park as her security for the deferred payments. This section of the contract, which is one of its vital points, reads as follows:

"It is further stipulated and agreed by and between the said parties that the said party of the second part (Mrs. Phinney) will make no claim under said ordinance, this contract or said mortgage, or under either one or more of said instruments, that the said party of the second part has any right or remedy against said party of the first part (the city) for the collection or enforcement of any of said sums, or any part thereof, secured by said mortgage, except to resort to the property mortgaged.

"It is expressly stipulated and agreed by and between the parties hereto that no personal or general liability on the part of the city of Seattle is created by this contract beyond the money now in the city park fund of the city of Seattle, available for the payment of said first cash payment of $5,000 to be paid on the acceptance of the deed."

Mr. Thomson Grows Sarcastic.

Mr. Thomson opposed the purchase. He grew sarcastic in referring to the speeches of the attorneys. "The arguments on both sides are convincing," he said. Then the president of the board asked Corporation Counsel Humphrey for an opinion as to the right of the board to sign the contract.

"If the contract is executed and the ordinance held to be illegal, can the city recover the $5,000 paid to Mrs. Phinney?" asked Mr. Thomson.

Mr. Humphrey, replying, said: "The council has passed this ordinance. The board, in executing the contract, is performing only a ministerial act. I would not pretend to say how a lawsuit might terminate. There is no legal objection at this time to the execution of the contract by the board."

Mr. Thomson then wanted to know if the board had any discretion in the matter. Mr. Humphrey said if the board did not execute the contract it was probable the superior court would issue a writ of mandate directing it so to do, a statement which Gen. Carr disputed.

Mr. Thomson then raised the question of the lateness of the hour, it being then after 5:30 o'clock. Finally, a motion made by Mr. Little and seconded by Mr. Youngs that the president be directed to sign the contract prevailed by a two-thirds vote. Mr. Thomson not voting.

The session of the board ended after Mr. Thomson had affixed his signature to the contract.