Southern Planter

members of the senate are as free to express opinions pending a decision upon general excitement as the people; and if

were desirous of being

re-elected, he

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much less difficulty find out what would

majority of them, than the people:

An

jority of the people influencing

the

dec

judge by an open and avowed

promise of

or threat of punishment, it is

out of the

bxu

they never old be assembled together and

thus to act in concert; and

even if they

he

great indelicacy and daring

impropriety of

proceeding would deter them; for it

otherwise than publicly

done, and

any atle

could

constrain the opinion of a judge

would justly

on the actors in such a scene

not so circumstanced are the Governor

a

lasting

dr

members of the senate, a majority of whom

privat

intimate to the judge their sentiments

thus coerce him to decide in accordance

wishes or run the risk of not being appoint

And as or the judge corrupting a majority

people, thereby securing his election it is

possibly corrupt one man, the Governor and

his nomination, and a majority of the senate

cure a confirmation.

of the question; whereas on the other

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In order to compare the effect of these two

by placing them fully in opposition, one to

cr let us examine two fictitious cases complete

point, and 1: we will suppose that the

court are expected to be called upon soon after

election, to decide that question (which no

pity for the state is settled by compromise

which some months ago greatly agitated the

community) to wit: Had the legislature any

right to charter the Planters Bank? Or,

granted such a charter--is it lawful for that

to exercise it? Here is a matter of deep an

eral interest to be decided; and we will

that both appointing powers would be equal

desirous of sustaining the new Bank: Now

judges are to be elected by the people, high

decorous as it may be, the several candidates

be called upon to prejudge this question, by

profession of their opinions either for or agoi

and upon this, the election would be made to

Methinks I already hear some one opposed

people, cry out--to what a deplorable state

perfdoncy would our judiciary be reduced by

a mode as this!' - I grant it: but does not th

objection bear with equal, if not with greater:

upon the other mode?--We will suppose the:

are also many candidates before the legislatip

the supreme Bench--they not in like a

be called upon to pre-judge this question n4

haps the Governor and senate, before they vm

sent to nominate and appoint any of them, m

quire that they shall unequivocally declare the

selves in favor of the validity- of the charte

new Bank: and thus the other candidates

because-they are too high minded and honest:

to feignly to prostrate the judicial character, byi-

mature expression of their sentiments, or because

they are of a different opinion from, the Gore.

and senate, lose their election: a state of things

this kind, without some adequate remedy to

vent it, would be liable to occur at every political

cal canvass of these officers: but fortunately there

is an one, equally adapted to the prevention dj

danger in both of these cases may be derived

it in this:'Let some constitutional provision

adopted, making the penalty of, prejudging

1er by a candidate for the judgeship, and put,

hin judgment, : no less than a disqualification

that office: And in any event even if judges

ected to hold- their offices during good beba

it would be a wise policy to introduce such ad:

into the constitution: upon the adoption of

such a safeguard, there would seem to be but little difference between the two supposed cases, on that

of independence; there is, however, a difference

the facility with which this safeguard may be!

ed; which results in making it preferable pi

the election by the people and for this reason.

although the penalty for prejudging a cause

be disqualification for office, yet a judge might

acruple to declare his opinion beforehand, m

ly and confidentially, in the ear of one i

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Governor, when he would not dare to run

of publishing it to the people,'

2. We will suppose in

second case al

the same vexed question, above stated, is agitating the whole community; but that it did not

until just after the commencement of a term

of office, and that it must be settled before the

election for judges; it being our object here to

compare the weight of influence, the might be

exercised by the appointing power in the middle

term, and to show wherein there is a manifest

difference in favor of an election by the people:,

we will assume again, that both of the appoi

powers would be equally solicitous, to have

question settled in favor of the newly chartered

Bank. Now, though the people are acknowledged

to be the masters and the judges (who have been

chosen by them) to be their servants,--howe

can they be compelled by the people to decide in f

of the validity of the new charter? It is not li

that the judges would be influenced by any

short of the avowed wish of an ascertained ma

jority; but how can that majority bring the weight

of its power to bear upon the judges, just previous

to their decision, thereby changing it and rendering

it dependent? Could the people en masse threaten

the judges, that if they decided against the

Bank they would not support them for a re

election? Is it probable that even a dozen of the

leaders would venture to menace them, and attempt

to bias their opinions? and suppose they should

have the audacity to do so, is it not very improbable

that the judges would heed their threats!

would reason thus "what do we care for these

"the votes of these dozen men and their influence

it is the people of the whole state to whom

"look for support, and they if assured that we

"honestly done what we thought was our duty

"approbate our conduct."

On the other hand

let us examine that weight of influence which might

this case be exercised by one or more branches

the Legislature: here also the

Governor and

ate, holding as it were the future

destinies of

judges in their hands, may be said to stand

In

manor

with

them

in

the

relationship

of master

servant: They, as a matter of course, having

sisted and concurred in chartering the new Bank

must be of opinion that it ought to be sustained

and if the power of re-appointing is lodged

with them, the Governor might seek a private interview

with the judges, just previously to a decision

if he found their opinions inclining against the

institution, he might by a chain of reasoning endeavor

to convince them that they were in error:

we all know this would be highly indecorous

either the one to speak, or the other to hear such

language, yet to so great a depth of depravity

men are liable to fall; it might be done;) and in the course

of his arguments, he might further take occasion

to say, that he never would stop until he carried