Richmond Enquirer

DOCUMENTS,&C.-(Continued.)
Copy of a communication made by Commodore Stephen Decatur, dated January 2d, 1817, in relation to the defence of the Chesapeake Bay, and the selection of a site suitable for a Naval Depot.
Navy-Commissioners' Office,
2d January, 1817.
SIR,
In obedience to your call of the 10th ult. to the navy commissioners, requiring a report of the late examination and surveys made under their direction, in pursuance of your instructions of the 7th May, I enclose you a statement of such facts as I have been enabled to collect upon this important subject.
From the diversity of opinion which we have found to exist between us, upon this important subject, we have deemed it most satisfactory to give in separate reports. This diversity was perhaps to have been expected, in a case presenting so wide a range for observation ; and I trust we shall not be considered as too tenacious of our individual opinions, when it is recollected that this question involves the safety of the navy, and the protection of the extensive shores of the Chesapeake.
The first examination required by your order of the 7th, is, to ascertain the most proper mode of defending the Chesapeake in time of war.
In giving my opinion upon this head, I beg leave to be understood, as disclaiming all knowledge of the expense of constructing fortifications, for particular estimates of which, I beg leave to refer you to Lieut. Col. Bomford, of the engineers, who accompanied us on this survey.
The Chesapeake Bay can be defended from a superior hostile fleet only by fortifications sank at some point in the channel, and the point nearest the ocean susceptible of defence, is obviously the most proper. The channel of the bay at the capes, navigable by ships of a large class, is near three quarters of a mile wide, depth of water generally from ten to fourteen fathoms. The sea at this point, being uninterrupted by shoals from the Atlantic, would, in my opinion, render fortifications utterly impracticable. Ascending the bay from the capes, the channel branches at the Horse Shoe, one branch passing into Hampton Roads, the other leading up the bay itself--
That branch of the channel which leads up to Hampton Roads, passes between two shoals: that on the south side called Willoughby's, and distant from Old Point Comfort about 2 and a quarter miles, having fifteen feet water on it: the one on the north side is called the Thimbles, and is distant from Old Point about three miles, and has nine feet water in it; they are about a geographical mile apart from each other. The other branch of the channel at that point is protected from the heavy sea of the Atlantic, by the shoal of the Middle Ground, which stretches many miles to sea, and on which its violence is expended before it reaches this channel. If the Chesapeake be susceptible of defence at all, it is my opinion, this is the only point at which it can be defended.--
The channel at every other place, above or below, being much wider, and of much greater depth, and that works, judiciously constructed, between the tail of the Horse Shoe and Middle Ground, would be permanent, strong evidence is furnished by those extensive works which form the Harbour of Cherbourg ; works constructed on a sand, unprotected by shoals without, where the sea is as violent, the tide infinitely stronger, and its perpendicular rise upwards of forty feet.
You will perceive, sir, that in considering the subject of defending the Chesapeake generally, I have included the defence of Hampton Roads; not only as an arm of the Bay, nor on account of the objects of spoil, to which the banks of its rivers invite an enemy, but with reference to the other inquiry of a Naval Depot to which I shall presently call your attention. In relation to the defence of Hampton Roads particularly-if the defence of this place were the exclusive object, there is another position for the purpose, which would probably be preferable, which is Old Point Comfort, and the opposite shoal called the Rip Raps, which are less than one mile distant.--I beg leave to refer you to a report made upon the subject by colonel Bomford, merely noticing, that I understand was made out before it was discovered that the water on Willoughby's shoals and the Thimbles, was so shallow, or that those shoals approached so nearly together as they do. I will now further add The authority of general Bernard's opinion, that any distance not exceeding one mile, may be so fortified, as to be rendered impassable.
If, in addition to powerful works placed at the entrance into Hampton Roads, we add that part of the naval force already contemplated, which will probably be stationed within the Roads, the only inducement a hostile fleet could have to attempt passing heavy batteries, so moored as to aid in obstructing the enemy's passage, and sufficiently near to be sustained by the forts, in the event of their passing, I do not believe it will ever be attempted. Let us suppose Hampton Roads thus fortified, and our Naval Depot, as well as our fleet drawn within those defences, what inducement would remain to an enemy to attempt a passage up the bay? The destruction of our fleet and our depot, would be their first object; their second, would be to prevent our fleet from getting to sea; either of those objects would keep them necessarily in the vicinity of the Roads. The pillage of the shores of the Chesapeake and its waters, would be the only remaining inducement for a cruise up the bay-an inducement too trifling to permit the belief that they would abandon for it the important objects that they would leave in the neighborhood of Hampton Roads; and more particularly when their passage up the bay, is opposed by batteries stretched across the Channel at the Horse Shoe and the Middle Ground, and with a fleet, too, in their rear, ready to act, in the event of their receiving such injury, as is more than probable they would receive, in passing such works. The non-existence of any object of sufficient importance to invite an enemy up the bay, under the arrangements already stated, would render it unnecessary to have the works between the Horse Shoe & the Middle Ground, as numerous or as strong, by one half, as would be otherwise requisite.
And it is my opinion, that the bay and Hampton Roads are susceptible of permanent and complete defence, by works erected at the points proposed, and the same works be made to serve for the defence of both ; whereby the whole expense of fortifying the Naval Depot would be saved, as well as the expense of keeping up garrisons. What the expense of such works would be, I am incapable of saying ; but I am satisfied that the cost to the nation of defending the shores of the Chesapeake for one single war, would greatly surpass what would be requisite to erect a permanent defence of the bay; and when we connect with this the debasement of permitting the enemy to make a home of our waters, the consideration of any warrantable expenditure can scarcely be thought to oppose an obstacle to the establishment of any works which may be determined to be practicable.
I come now to the location of the Naval Depot; and on this point there are a few simple principles which seem decisive of the inquiry. A Naval Depot should possess a sufficiency of water ; it should be contiguous to the ocean, otherwise the navy could not render that prompt protection to the coast, which comprises the greater part of its utility : it should, also, be connected with the means of supplies of timber and naval stores, which no posture of war could cut off or interrupt: these are qualities of the first necessity.
There are other advantages, not indeed so indispensable, but still of a very high character, & which it would be extremely fortunate to find with the qualities of primary importance already mentioned; such, for example, as a populous neighbourhood, from which supplies of labour and provisions might be commodiously drawn, and which would be at hand to give support to the depot in the event of a sudden attack, another of those incidental advantages, is a large, safe, and well defended outer harbour, into which the ships, when built, could be drawn and maneuvered, without the hazard of exposure to a superior enemy.
Hampton Roads, which I consider the outer harbour of Norfolk, is 18 miles from Cape Henry. Ships can enter or proceed to sea from it, with the wind from any quarter; it furnishes excellent anchorage, and has sufficient room for a fleet to manoeuvre in under sail-an advantage which no other harbour, that I know of, possesses. The distance from Hampton Roads to the navy yard at Gosport is 12 miles, and the shallowest water, found in the river at ordinary high tides, 25 feet. This depth is more than sufficient for the 74's we now have. You will find on the file in your office that the pilotage paid for the Independence seventy-four, when she sailed for the Mediterranean, was 24 feet. The ships now building, although of greater capacity, will not draw so much by six inches. The present defences of Norfolk are, in my opinion, sufficient to protect it from any naval force that can be brought against it,
It will be recollected that during the late war the enemy considered it absolutely necessary to get possession of Craney Island, before they could pass up to Norfolk with their shipping; in consequence of which a combined attack by their boats, and a considerable land force, was made on Craney Island. The attack was repelled by a few pieces of cannon placed upon the sand; since which time it has been regularly fortified. All the approaches to Norfolk and the navy yard, by land, are interrupted by water courses, and lead through swamps; both places, with the exception of about two hundred yards, are insulated by creeks, unfordable by reason of the deep mud. Those creeks can, and I believe, have been connected by military works, nor is there any higher ground than that on which they stand, within cannon range of either place.
It is the opinion of military men who have commanded there, that they are particularly well situated for defence against an attack by land. From Craney Island up to the navy yard, which I consider the inner harbour, is 6 miles, in which space thirty sail of the line may lay with perfect convenience, and it is at all times so smooth as not to interrupt the ordinary work of repairs that may be required. From Norfolk to Hampton Roads large ships cannot sail when the wind is ahead, in consequence of the narrowness of the channel. But if warping anchors, with buoys be laid down in the channel (as is the case in all men of war harbours that are close) ships can, with any wind, be warped into the Roads.
The harbours of Malta and Port Mahon, which are considered two of the best harbors in Europe, can only be left or entered, when the wind is adverse, by warping. The navy yard at Norfolk comprises, within its walls, a square of about twenty acres, one side of which lays upon the channel of the river, at which 18 sail of the line can be laid up in ordinary, if they
abundance of oak and pine timber suitable for naval purposes and also naval stores, a supply of which cannot be cut off by a blockading enemy. The advantage it possesses in consequence of its vicinity to a commercial city, would be considerable, both as it regards the numerous mechanics and seamen that are to be obtained there, and the protection a large population would afford in the event of a sudden attack. The climate of Norfolk is I presume, similar to that of the shores of the Chesapeake generally on tide water. I will now proceed to the examination of York river. From Cape Henry light-house to Gloucester town, which is the first point on York river that could be rendered sufficiently strong to prevent the passage of a hostile fleet is thirty-two miles. Ships can enter or proceed to sea from it with all winds. The distance from Gloucester to the Clay Banks, the place contemplated for the Navy Yard, is seven miles, and the depth of water is sufficient for any ships at all times of tide. It can unquestionably be defended against any attack by water; it is, at present, entirely unprotected by any fortifications. From the best information I have been enabled to collect, I am induced to believe, that there are several rivers putting in from the bay navigable for light craft and boats, and approaching within eight or nine miles of the Clay Banks, where a debarkation of troops might be effected ;-of the nature of the intervening grounds I am unacquainted. The site selected as the best in this river for a Naval Depot, forms at present part of the bed of the river, and no vessel drawing ten feet water can approach the bank nearer than a quarter of a mile. As the bottom is mud, it is probable that it will be found necessary to drive piles for the foundation of the Navy Yard, and the whole Yard, must, of course, be composed of artificial or made ground. There is a creek on each side of the landing, about half a mile in the rear, where they approach within about four hundred yards ; at this point it is proposed placing the defences against a land attack. A- bout eight hundred or a thousand yards to the right of this position and the contemplated de- pot, there is an extensive range of heights that overlook and command them. In consequence of which, I am of opinion that this position cannot be defended from a land attack with a less force than would be competent to meet the assailants in the field. It is believed that a supply of oak timber may be obtained from the shores of York river; but pine, fit for naval purposes, and naval stores, must be drawn from a distance. A blockading force, in time of war, might prevent the transportation of them by water, the only means by which they could be obtained, in any quantity. From the unusual straightness of York river, the mouth of which lies open to the bay, it is much more rough, with particular winds, than rivers of its width generally are. With the wind blowing fresh up or down the river. I should apprehend that any repairs that would require working near the water, would be interrupted. The inner harbour of this river, like that of Norfolk, cannot be left or entered when the wind is ahead, except by warping. The next point embraced by your instructions, is Tangier Islands, lying about one hundred miles up the Chesapeake. From the survey and report of captain Spence, the commissioners were of opinion, that that place was totally unfit for a Naval Depot, and, therefore, did not proceed to examine it. For particular information respecting this place, I beg leave to refer you to captain Spence's survey and report As your instructions did not particularize St. Mary's, and not being apprised that my colleagues intended to examine that place, I was not present when they did so. It lies on the upper side of Potomac river, near its mouth, and about an hundred and twenty miles up the Chesapeake Bay. I am unacquainted with the depth of water--the extent of the harbor-its susceptibility of defence against an attack by water, or the supply of naval stores and building materials in its vicinity. From my want of local knowledge of this place, I can say nothing as to its particular ad- vantages, and can only point out some prominent objections which present themselves. Its distance from the ocean, I consider an insuperable objection to it as a Naval Depot & rendezvous, in consequence of the difficulty and detention our ships might meet with in going out or returning from sea. Another objection is, that the population for a considerable distance is so thin. that it cannot afford sufficient succour in case of a sudden attack. The river Patuxent lies a few miles higher up the bay than the Potomac, and approaches where it is navigable for vessels of the largest class. within five miles of the rear of the harbour of St. Mary's. The harbor is every where surrounded on the land side by commanding heights, which are too numerous to be occupied and sustained, except by a large army; and therefore it would be necessary that a considerable land force should be kept there at all times to ensure its safety. Another very important objection is, that if the neighborhood does not afford sufficient supplies of timber, which I believe is the case, they might be cut off in time of war by a blockading force. This place, as well as the harbors of Norfolk and York, from the narrowness of its channel, can only be left or entered when the wind is adverse, by warping. Its climate is very similar to the climate of those places. There is an objection, common to both York and St. Mary's, as the places of Naval Deposite, which has not yet been mentioned; and that is, that they both lie within the defences proposed to be raised from the Horse Shoe to the Middle Ground. If you present to the enemy the combined attractions of your depot and your fleet, those works for the defence of the bay, must be more numerous and strong, and consequently, much more expensive ; and it is for this, among other reasons, that I think it so much preferable to place both these objects behind the defences proposed to be established at the mouth of Hampton Roads. Having weighed all the advantages and disadvantages of the several positions, it is my decided opinion that the present navy yard at Norfolk, independent of the protection it would afford the Chesapeake, is, in all respects, incomparably the best place for a Naval Depot, if Hampton Roads be properly fortified; and in that case, I should consider it the finest harbor I have ever seen.-The only objection to it, in its present state. is the mud-bar at the mouth of the river, over which our largest ships cannot pass at low water; which is a sufficient objection in the present unprotected state of Hampton Roads, inasmuch as any of our larger ships chased into the Roads by a superior naval force at dead low water, could not pass the bar at the mouth of the river, and would, of course be exposed to attack. The expense of the requisite buildings for a Naval Depot at either of the other places. together with the fortifications necessary for the protection of them by land and by water, would, in my opinion, be much greater than would be necessary to fortify Hampton Roads completely. Should either of the other places be fortified, they would require a much larger force to garrison them, and would render no material aid in the general defence of the Chesapeake. Permit me further to observe, sir, that it is the unanimous opinion of the Board, that the waters of the Chesapeake should, at some point or other, be the place of a Naval Depot and rendezvous. The mildness of the climate enabling the workmen to continue their labor throughout almost the whole of the year, and the geographical situation of the place, seem to me to fit it eminently for this purpose. It is near the centre of our coast and of our commerce; and that portion of the navy which would be stationed there, would possess, thereby a facility in defending both by the rapid movements it would be enabled to make ; and I have no hesitation in expressing the opinion that by raising the fortifications which I have proposed, and placing the Depot near the ocean, the Chesapeake, at present the most vulnerable point of the coast, would become one of the strongest. It would become itself a defence to our sea-board, The subjoined sketch of the waters in the vicinity of the Chesapeake, was furnished me at a few hours notice. by Mr. Adams of the U. S. Navy, who made a survey of the Chesapeake under the direction of the Board. The well known talents and precision of this gentleman, leaves no doubt of the accuracy of his lines.